REDEMOS Working Paper D4.1

Executive Summary

The EU’s ability to provide effective and sustainable democracy support to its eastern neighbours hinges on its thorough knowledge of the state of democracy on the ground, together with a deep understanding of the relevant trends characterising democratisation and, where relevant, authoritarianisation processes in individual countries. This working paper responds to these needs by providing an in-depth stocktaking of democracy building efforts and failures in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine between 2010 and 2022. Examining key aspects of democratic rule, such as elections, political and civil rights, and judicial and legislative constraints on the executive, the paper seeks to provide interested decision- makers, scholars, civil society representatives and students with a comprehensive overview of how the six countries’ political institutions have developed during this period. Moreover, and in line with the REDEMOS project’s understanding of the centrality of the “demos” in the transition towards and the sustainability of democracy, the working paper also analyses the support for democratic principles within the broader populations; the skills and resources that citizens possess to sustain and advocate for democracy; as well as their active participation in the political process. Finally, the paper provides a discussion of some of the most relevant contemporary political trends shaping each country’s domestic politics. Together with D2.1 (Working Paper on Stocktaking of EU democracy support towards the eastern neighbourhood), this working paper (D4.1) is part of REDEMOS’ first stage of retrospective scrutiny, aiming to take stock of both EU and EU member states’ efforts at democracy support towards the eastern neighbourhood, as well as of the six individual countries’ successes and failures in democracy building.

Democratic and authoritarian developments in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood throughout the period 2010- 2022 were marked by a high level of heterogeneity, with both democratic progress and regression, as well as authoritarianisation, having become ever more consolidated, not least in light of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The region has seen further entrenchments of authoritarian practices and cementation of dictatorial rule (Azerbaijan and Belarus), democratic backsliding (Georgia) as well as significant, though fragile, democratic reform processes (Armenia, Moldova and Ukraine). Despite this variance, the EU’s six eastern neighbours share some important commonalities. None of the countries have an independent, professional, transparent, and accountable judiciary. In recent years, not least given Russian disinformation, all of them also witnessed, albeit to a different extent, restrictions to the freedom of expression. To the extent that there is a common thread connecting the formidable challenges all these countries encounter on their way to democratisation or – at the very least – rolling back authorianisation, this revolves around oligarchisation and corruption. The region’s ruling elites – both democratic and authoritarian – rely heavily on personality politics and distinct leadership networks, a feature which has enabled them to remain relatively resilient in the face of a multitude of internal and external challenges to their rule.

Emboldened by Azerbaijan’s successful military campaign in and around Nagorno-Karabakh and President Ilham Aliyev’s ensuing domestic popularity, Azerbaijan’s political regime has deepened its authoritarian nature and moved closer to being a ‘closed autocracy’, systematically restricting citizens’ rights and freedoms and dismantling any remaining vestiges of political opposition and civic activism in the country. These developments come against the background of a decade of steadily deteriorating or stagnating performance on all democracy indicators examined here, and which continues the broader trend apparent already after 1992. As far as Belarus is concerned, notwithstanding the minor democratic concessions of the 2014 – 2019 period, designed to improve the country’s international standing and facilitate cooperation with the West, the regime has displayed autocratic stasis, with hardly any change in its democracy status between 2012 – 2020. Following the August 2020 presidential election, a clear and dramatic downward trend can be discerned, and the country can now be said to be on a pathway towards a full-blown totalitarian system, with ever-more military and economic leverage exerted by Russia.

As a result of the 2018 Velvet Revolution, Armenia recently transitioned from electoral autocracy to electoral democracy, but has been moderately regressing again more recently. The most decisive factor negatively impacting its democratic post-revolution trajectory is the fallout of the war with Azerbaijan and the ensuing protracted domestic crisis which has enhanced, rather than reduced, political polarisation. Georgia has been an electoral democracy for more than a decade but is increasingly faced with the monopolisation of the decision-making process by the governing Georgian Dream party and the informal rule of the oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili. In that context, it has been characterised by degradation of state institutions, elite corruption, a stalled judiciary reform, contested media freedoms, and repeated attempts to crackdown on a civil society which itself shows growing signs of engagement and mobilisation fatigue. As a result, the democratic progress Georgia has achieved since 2012 has begun unravelling, with the country regressing to the lowest level of democracy in a decade. It remains to be seen if the granting of EU candidate status in December 2023 can act as a stimulus for addressing democratic shortcomings and revitalising reform processes. Moldova has been assessed as an electoral democracy, except for the episode of democratic breakdown that coincides largely with oligarchic rule in 2016-2019. However, the country bounced back to electoral democracy thanks to the vigour and collective action of a critical segment of Moldovan elite, civil society, and the general public. In recent years, Moldova’s democratic development has been on a clear upward trajectory – a dynamic that is also reflected in the European Commission’s 2023 recommendation to open EU accession negotiations.

Following the removal of President Viktor Yanukovych from office in early 2014, Ukraine has also seen significant democratic progress. Elections have generally been deemed free and relatively fair, but observers noted flaws in each of them. Also, there have been notable improvements with regards to political and civil liberties, but concerns have been raised regarding the rights of ethnic and linguistic minorities. More generally, efforts to combat corruption and to enhance transparency have encountered formidable resistance from entrenched state structures and oligarchic circles, though the latter’s sway over Ukrainian politics has been reduced in recent years. Despite these setbacks, the overall direction of Ukraine’s transition towards a consolidated democracy seems locked in for the time being. Two factors are especially relevant in this context. First, citizens and civil society have become increasingly invested in the political arena and are demanding change. Secondly, ever-closer political and defence cooperation with the EU and other Western actors is accompanied by these actors’ encouragement of and support for further democratic reforms, particularly after the European Council on 14 December 2023 decided to open accession talks with Ukraine.

The democratic and autocratic trajectories of the six eastern neighbourhood countries examined here during the period 2010 – 2022, while highly diverse in their manifestation and root causes, point to the critical role of the demos in bringing about democratic change, sustaining democratic progress and deterring or reverting democratic regression, in particular when these processes are simultaneously supported by political elites and organised civil societies. Where elites, civil societies and citizens have jointly pushed for democratic reforms, as in the cases of Moldova, Ukraine and Armenia, remarkable progress has been achieved. When civil society and citizens join forces in calling out corrupt, democratically flawed governments, democratic regression can be stopped in its tracks, though the extent to which this can pave the way for genuine democratic progress in the absence of a buy-in from political elites, remains questionable, as Georgia’s case poignantly shows. At the same time, autocrats which control domestic and external levers of power are likely to quash any dissent resulting from the joining of forces between civil society and citizens, as the example of Belarus starkly demonstrates. And where civil society has been gradually but steadily decimated and the regime still enjoys popular legitimacy, as in Azerbaijan, widespread demands for democracy are still far- fetched. What all these democratic and autocratic experiences show is that the ‘virtuous triangle’ of citizens, civil society and political elites must be carefully cultivated both domestically by those advocating and struggling for democracy, and externally by those international actors who support these processes.