REDEMOS Working Paper D3.1, March 2024
Conceptual framework EU democracy funding
Tina Freyburg, Madalina Dobrescu, and Anastasiia Vlasenko
This working paper outlines a conceptual framework to provide a coherent structure for our further data collection and analysis efforts. Drawing on this research, we make two contributions: First, we conceptually acknowledge the varieties of democracy in democracy assistance, and second, we empirically assess which of these varieties of democracy prevail in EU democracy assistance to the eastern neighbourhood countries, over time and across partner countries.
Keywords: Democracy promotion, democracy assistance, european union, eastern neighbourhood, eastern europe, post-soviet space, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia
REDEMOS Working Paper D3.1
Conceptual framework EU democracy funding
Executive Summary
As the first deliverable of Work Package 3, the main objective of which is to collect and analyse data on democracy funding by the European Union (EU), EU member states and other international donors, this working paper outlines a conceptual framework to provide a coherent structure for our further data collection and analysis efforts. The framework is designed to overcome many of the challenges of researching a phenomenon as difficult to capture empirically as ‘funding for democracy’, where donors continue to face challenges in accurately identifying what they are spending and where clear figures are often not available. This is partly because democracy assistance is often intertwined with other financial support, and comparisons between categories of aid from different donors are not straightforward. In this paper, we acknowledge that part of this apparent confusion is due to different understandings of what should be promoted in the name of democracy. Comparativists remind us that polities differ in the way their political institutions put democracy into practice. More recently, research has shown that individuals and collectives also differ in their understanding of democracy and, consequently, in what they expect from it. Drawing on this research, we make two contributions: First, we conceptually acknowledge the varieties of democracy in democracy assistance, and second, we empirically assess which of these varieties of democracy prevail in EU democracy assistance to the eastern neighbourhood countries, over time and across partner countries.
Our exploratory study shows that the EU mainly promotes a common understanding of liberal democracy, but not exclusively. Its investment in a peacebuilding variety of democracy assistance is significant and unsurprising, given the unstable nature of many of the hybrid political regimes in the region, the grave security challenges that virtually every single one of the six eastern neighbours is nowadays facing, and the authoritarian or authoritarianising nature of some of the regimes. At the same time, and unexpectedly, the participatory variety of democracy assistance has become more prominent over time, and in particular since 2013. The modest representation of the egalitarian model is to some extent unexpected, given the EU’s alleged proclivity to focus on the socioeconomic conditions supporting democracy. The electoral and feminist models are the most scarcely funded of the six varieties of assistance proposed here. Whether EU democracy assistance is driven by declared strategic priorities and/or policy substance, or alternatively, by external events and shocks, remains an open question. Similarly, we cannot confirm that stability trumps democracy when it comes to the EU’s approach to democracy assistance. What emerges, instead, is a mixed picture behind which it is difficult to discern consistent trends. Like so much of EU foreign policy, the provision of democracy assistance appears to unfold in an ad hoc or path dependent manner, as opposed to a strategic or externally reactive evolution. Looking forward, it will be important to continue exploring the preliminary hypotheses formulated in this paper, together with new ones, in addition to analysing additional data on EU member states and other international actors’ democracy assistance in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood, with a few to bringing to the fore key trends and puzzles in EU and international democracy assistance.
Keywords: Democracy promotion, democracy assistance, european union, eastern neighbourhood, eastern europe, post-soviet space, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia
Citation: Freyburg, T., Dobrescu, M., & Vlasenko, A. (2024). Conceptual framework EU democracy funding: Unpacking EU democracy assistance. What model of democracy does EU funding suit? REDEMOS Working Paper D3.1. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.13310202
REDEMOS Working Paper D4.1, May 2024
Democratic progress, stasis, regression and authoritarianisation in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood
Madalina Dobrescu and Ragnar Weilandt
This working paper provides an in-depth stocktaking of democracy building efforts and failures in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine between 2010 and 2022. The democratic and autocratic trajectories of the six eastern neighbourhood countries examined point to the critical role of the demos in bringing about democratic change, sustaining democratic progress and deterring or reverting democratic regression, in particular when these processes are simultaneously supported by political elites and organised civil societies.
Keywords: Democratization, political transition, eastern europe, south caucasus, political participation, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia
REDEMOS Working Paper D4.1
Democratic progress, stasis, regression and authoritarianisation in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood
Executive Summary
The EU’s ability to provide effective and sustainable democracy support to its eastern neighbours hinges on its thorough knowledge of the state of democracy on the ground, together with a deep understanding of the relevant trends characterising democratisation and, where relevant, authoritarianisation processes in individual countries. This working paper responds to these needs by providing an in-depth stocktaking of democracy building efforts and failures in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine between 2010 and 2022. Examining key aspects of democratic rule, such as elections, political and civil rights, and judicial and legislative constraints on the executive, the paper seeks to provide interested decision- makers, scholars, civil society representatives and students with a comprehensive overview of how the six countries’ political institutions have developed during this period. Moreover, and in line with the REDEMOS project’s understanding of the centrality of the “demos” in the transition towards and the sustainability of democracy, the working paper also analyses the support for democratic principles within the broader populations; the skills and resources that citizens possess to sustain and advocate for democracy; as well as their active participation in the political process. Finally, the paper provides a discussion of some of the most relevant contemporary political trends shaping each country’s domestic politics. Together with D2.1 (Working Paper on Stocktaking of EU democracy support towards the eastern neighbourhood), this working paper (D4.1) is part of REDEMOS’ first stage of retrospective scrutiny, aiming to take stock of both EU and EU member states’ efforts at democracy support towards the eastern neighbourhood, as well as of the six individual countries’ successes and failures in democracy building.
Democratic and authoritarian developments in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood throughout the period 2010- 2022 were marked by a high level of heterogeneity, with both democratic progress and regression, as well as authoritarianisation, having become ever more consolidated, not least in light of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The region has seen further entrenchments of authoritarian practices and cementation of dictatorial rule (Azerbaijan and Belarus), democratic backsliding (Georgia) as well as significant, though fragile, democratic reform processes (Armenia, Moldova and Ukraine). Despite this variance, the EU’s six eastern neighbours share some important commonalities. None of the countries have an independent, professional, transparent, and accountable judiciary. In recent years, not least given Russian disinformation, all of them also witnessed, albeit to a different extent, restrictions to the freedom of expression. To the extent that there is a common thread connecting the formidable challenges all these countries encounter on their way to democratisation or – at the very least – rolling back authorianisation, this revolves around oligarchisation and corruption. The region’s ruling elites – both democratic and authoritarian – rely heavily on personality politics and distinct leadership networks, a feature which has enabled them to remain relatively resilient in the face of a multitude of internal and external challenges to their rule.
Emboldened by Azerbaijan’s successful military campaign in and around Nagorno-Karabakh and President Ilham Aliyev’s ensuing domestic popularity, Azerbaijan’s political regime has deepened its authoritarian nature and moved closer to being a ‘closed autocracy’, systematically restricting citizens’ rights and freedoms and dismantling any remaining vestiges of political opposition and civic activism in the country. These developments come against the background of a decade of steadily deteriorating or stagnating performance on all democracy indicators examined here, and which continues the broader trend apparent already after 1992. As far as Belarus is concerned, notwithstanding the minor democratic concessions of the 2014 – 2019 period, designed to improve the country’s international standing and facilitate cooperation with the West, the regime has displayed autocratic stasis, with hardly any change in its democracy status between 2012 – 2020. Following the August 2020 presidential election, a clear and dramatic downward trend can be discerned, and the country can now be said to be on a pathway towards a full-blown totalitarian system, with ever-more military and economic leverage exerted by Russia.
As a result of the 2018 Velvet Revolution, Armenia recently transitioned from electoral autocracy to electoral democracy, but has been moderately regressing again more recently. The most decisive factor negatively impacting its democratic post-revolution trajectory is the fallout of the war with Azerbaijan and the ensuing protracted domestic crisis which has enhanced, rather than reduced, political polarisation. Georgia has been an electoral democracy for more than a decade but is increasingly faced with the monopolisation of the decision-making process by the governing Georgian Dream party and the informal rule of the oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili. In that context, it has been characterised by degradation of state institutions, elite corruption, a stalled judiciary reform, contested media freedoms, and repeated attempts to crackdown on a civil society which itself shows growing signs of engagement and mobilisation fatigue. As a result, the democratic progress Georgia has achieved since 2012 has begun unravelling, with the country regressing to the lowest level of democracy in a decade. It remains to be seen if the granting of EU candidate status in December 2023 can act as a stimulus for addressing democratic shortcomings and revitalising reform processes. Moldova has been assessed as an electoral democracy, except for the episode of democratic breakdown that coincides largely with oligarchic rule in 2016-2019. However, the country bounced back to electoral democracy thanks to the vigour and collective action of a critical segment of Moldovan elite, civil society, and the general public. In recent years, Moldova’s democratic development has been on a clear upward trajectory – a dynamic that is also reflected in the European Commission’s 2023 recommendation to open EU accession negotiations.
Following the removal of President Viktor Yanukovych from office in early 2014, Ukraine has also seen significant democratic progress. Elections have generally been deemed free and relatively fair, but observers noted flaws in each of them. Also, there have been notable improvements with regards to political and civil liberties, but concerns have been raised regarding the rights of ethnic and linguistic minorities. More generally, efforts to combat corruption and to enhance transparency have encountered formidable resistance from entrenched state structures and oligarchic circles, though the latter’s sway over Ukrainian politics has been reduced in recent years. Despite these setbacks, the overall direction of Ukraine’s transition towards a consolidated democracy seems locked in for the time being. Two factors are especially relevant in this context. First, citizens and civil society have become increasingly invested in the political arena and are demanding change. Secondly, ever-closer political and defence cooperation with the EU and other Western actors is accompanied by these actors’ encouragement of and support for further democratic reforms, particularly after the European Council on 14 December 2023 decided to open accession talks with Ukraine.
The democratic and autocratic trajectories of the six eastern neighbourhood countries examined here during the period 2010 – 2022, while highly diverse in their manifestation and root causes, point to the critical role of the demos in bringing about democratic change, sustaining democratic progress and deterring or reverting democratic regression, in particular when these processes are simultaneously supported by political elites and organised civil societies. Where elites, civil societies and citizens have jointly pushed for democratic reforms, as in the cases of Moldova, Ukraine and Armenia, remarkable progress has been achieved. When civil society and citizens join forces in calling out corrupt, democratically flawed governments, democratic regression can be stopped in its tracks, though the extent to which this can pave the way for genuine democratic progress in the absence of a buy-in from political elites, remains questionable, as Georgia’s case poignantly shows. At the same time, autocrats which control domestic and external levers of power are likely to quash any dissent resulting from the joining of forces between civil society and citizens, as the example of Belarus starkly demonstrates. And where civil society has been gradually but steadily decimated and the regime still enjoys popular legitimacy, as in Azerbaijan, widespread demands for democracy are still far- fetched. What all these democratic and autocratic experiences show is that the ‘virtuous triangle’ of citizens, civil society and political elites must be carefully cultivated both domestically by those advocating and struggling for democracy, and externally by those international actors who support these processes.