Policy Papers

REDEMOS Policy Paper D2.3, December 2025

Contrasting EU and EU member states' democracy support action

Vassilis Karokis-Mavrikos, Theofanis Exadaktylos, Laura Chapell, Arusyak Aleksanyan, Valentina Gevorgyan & Alexander Maltsev

The REDEMOS Policy Paper D2.3 examines the normative consistency and instrumental complementarity of democracy support efforts by EU institutions and Member States across the Eastern Neighbourhood. The paper proposes a new analytical framework for evaluating democracy support, structured along two dimensions: normative consistency – the degree to which the EU and its Member States promote a shared set of democratic standards – and instrumental complementarity – the extent to which their operational approaches reinforce and compensate for each other.

Keywords: EU democracy promotion, democracy, eastern neighbourhood, democracy promotion, development aid, civil society, resilience, rule of law, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus

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REDEMOS Policy Paper D2.3
Contrasting EU and EU member states' democracy support action
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The REDEMOS Policy Paper D2.3 examines the normative consistency and instrumental complementarity of democracy support efforts by EU institutions and Member States across the Eastern Neighbourhood.

The paper proposes a new analytical framework for evaluating democracy support, structured along two dimensions: normative consistency – the degree to which the EU and its Member States promote a shared set of democratic standards – and instrumental complementarity – the extent to which their operational approaches reinforce and compensate for each other.

Drawing on REDEMOS Deliverables D2.1 and D2.2, which provide a systematic stocktaking of democracy support initiatives by the EU and key EU Member States in the Eastern Neighbourhood drawing on EU and OECD Official Development Assistance data, and using comparative case study approach, the paper assesses the degree of consistency and complementarity for all six Eastern Neighbourhood countries: Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus. Consistency in norms is assessed with respect to the rule of law, fundamental rights, civil society empowerment, and resilience, while complementarity in instruments is evaluated in relation to the nature and channels of democracy support delivery, sectoral prioritisation, and agility.

The comparative case study analysis reveals considerable variation in the democracy support models followed across the region. Ukraine and Moldova display both high consistency and high complementarity, reflecting, on aggregate mutually reinforcing EU and Member State approaches. Georgia exhibits high complementarity but low consistency: while instruments are well coordinated, normative fragmentation has limited strategic focus and has left space for democratic backsliding. Armenia, conversely, demonstrates high consistency but low complementarity as shared commitments to democracy promotion coexist with fragmented operational engagement. Azerbaijan and Belarus stand at the opposite end of the spectrum, with low consistency and low complementarity, as authoritarian resistance and restrictive conditions have reduced democracy support to a disjointed and largely reactive effort.

Crucially, drawing on the analysis, the policy paper identifies sources of strength and weakness, risks, and democracy support priorities for future policymaking, tailored to each Eastern Neighbourhood country.

Moreover, five cross-cutting implications are identified across the region. First, democracy is increasingly being framed as a security good, risking the subordination of democratic objectives to stability imperatives. Second, while resilience has become a guiding principle since the 2016 EU Global Strategy, its meaning and operationalisation remain uneven, demanding more context-sensitive application. Third, technocratic tendencies of EU democracy support have prioritised governance outcomes over value entrenchment, limiting the societal embedding of democratic norms. Fourth, consistency and complementarity must be treated as mutually reinforcing but distinct principles: normative alignment does not automatically produce operational synergy, and vice versa. Nevertheless, both are essential for an effective democracy support strategy. Finally, across all six countries, institutionalised participation, judicial oversight, and executive accountability remain under-addressed, and should feature more prominently as priorities in future efforts.

Citation: Karokis-Mavrikos, V., Exadaktylos, T., Chappell, L., Aleksanyan, A., Gevorgyan, V., & Maltsev, A. (2026). Contrasting EU and EU member states' democracy support action. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18222458

REDEMOS Policy Paper D3.3, February 2025

Trends, patterns and coordination in the EU, Member States’ and international institutions’ assistance to the eastern neighbourhood countries

Maryna Rabinovych & Stiven Kimmel

As the third deliverable of Work Package 3, the main objective of which is to collect and analyse data on democracy funding by the European Union (EU), EU member states and other international donors, this policy paper offers policy recommendations based on the analysis of patterns and trends of democracy funding in the EU’s six EN countries, as provided by the EU and its member states between 2005 and 2022. When relevant, it also draws parallels with the patterns and trends, characteristic for the assistance, provided by the United States (USA) (as the largest bilateral donor in the region) and international organisation, selected based on their engagement in the democratisation efforts in the region, including, amongst others, the International Development Association, the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund and the International Labour Organisation. The paper is based on descriptive statistics, derived from the dataset of democracy assistance to the EU’s EN countries, developed by REDEMOS.[1] The dataset was developed based on the data on financial flows provided under the framework of Official Development Assistance (ODA), reported by the European Commission to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) between 2005 and 2022, and includes 1474 entries. Thereby 222 relate to projects, funded by the European Commission, 646 by member states, 416 to the USA and 155 to international organisations.

Keywords: Eastern neighbourhood, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, EU, democracy funding, democracy assistance, democracy aid, humanitarian aid, Official Development Aid (ODA), OECD

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REDEMOS Policy Paper D3.3
Trends, patterns and coordination in the EU, Member States’ and international institutions’ assistance to the eastern neighbourhood countries
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Keywords: Eastern neighbourhood, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, EU, democracy funding, democracy assistance, democracy aid, humanitarian aid, Official Development Aid (ODA), OECD

As the third deliverable of Work Package 3, the main objective of which is to collect and analyse data on democracy funding by the European Union (EU), EU member states and other international donors, this policy paper offers policy recommendations based on the analysis of patterns and trends of democracy funding in the EU’s six EN countries, as provided by the EU and its member states between 2005 and 2022. When relevant, it also draws parallels with the patterns and trends, characteristic for the assistance, provided by the United States (USA) (as the largest bilateral donor in the region) and international organisation, selected based on their engagement in the democratisation efforts in the region, including, amongst others, the International Development Association, the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund and the International Labour Organisation. The paper is based on descriptive statistics, derived from the dataset of democracy assistance to the EU’s EN countries, developed by REDEMOS.1 The dataset was developed based on the data on financial flows provided under the framework of Official Development Assistance (ODA), reported by the European Commission to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) between 2005 and 2022, and includes 1474 entries. Thereby 222 relate to projects, funded by the European Commission, 646 by member states, 416 to the USA and 155 to international organisations.
The analysis presents six recommendations. First, based on the REDEMOS’ experience of working with the dataset, it highlights the need to introduce unified standards as to the scope of data on EU and member states’ democracy assistance projects, reported through the OECD library, as well as their classification. This is necessary, since existing differences in the way projects are described may influence their classification and, more broadly, even whether they at all are classified as democracy assistance.
Second, the analysis underscores the importance of the alignment of funding priorities and coordination on the substance of democracy projects between the EU, its member states and other actors, active in the EN region. Alongside the notable increase in overall democracy assistance for the region, this recommendation makes sense amidst the multiplicity of in democracy models, promoted by donors in the region, and difference in the degree to which they engage with related concepts, such as good governance, human rights, the rule of law and gender equality.
Third, the analysis points to the need for the EU and member states to stronger engage and support the electoral model of democracy in EN partner countries. Though free and fair elections lie at the heart of democracy and notwithstanding the rise of the external interference challenge, support to the electoral model of democracy received the smallest amount of support compared to all other models.
Fourth, this paper stresses the role of continuity of donor engagement with certain topics to ensure its effectiveness. The dataset reveals multiple instances of relatively small projects (below USD 1 million) implemented by donors in certain thematic areas (e.g. civil society support, women’s rights) within one of the EN countries. However, many of these initiatives were not followed up, limiting their long-term impact.
Fifth, the paper draws attention to the positive case of EU and member states’ multi-stakeholder support to Ukraine’s decentralisation reform and local empowerment as a potential model for long-term support of priority reforms in partner countries in the EN region and beyond. It is shown that the focus on a priority thematic area within a multi-stakeholder format allows for effective coordination between donors based on their specialisation and networks in a given partner country.
Finally, it is emphasized that long-termism and continuity should not be treated as imperatives, allowing for a fair balance between stability and adaptability in response to changes within partner countries and a turbulent geopolitical environment. Portfolio assessment is recommended as a tool to investigate the interplay in the impact various EU and member states’ initiatives have within dynamically evolving domestic and geopolitical policy contexts.

Citation: Rabinovych, M., & Kimmel, S. (2025). Trends, patterns and coordination in the EU, Member States' and international institutions' assistance to the eastern neighbourhood countries. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14794746

REDEMOS Policy Paper D4.2, December 2025

Separatism and Territorial Disputes as Factors Underpinning Democratization and Authoritarianization

Igor Gretskiy & Kakha Gogolashvili

This study aims to examine how separatism and territorial disputes influence the process of democratization in the countries of the European Union’s Eastern Neighbourhood. While a growing body of literature addresses the relationship between conflict and political development, it often assumes that democratization and conflict resolution are mutually reinforcing processes. However, the experience of post-Soviet states suggests a more complex and, in many cases, contradictory interplay.

Keywords: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, EU, eastern neighbourhood, democracy, separatism, territorial disputes, democratization, authoritarianization

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REDEMOS Policy Paper D4.2, December 2025
Separatism and Territorial Disputes as Factors Underpinning Democratization and Authoritarianization
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This paper examines the relationship between separatism, territorial disputes, and democratization in the countries of the European Union’s Eastern Neighbourhood. Drawing on comparative analysis of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova, it argues that externally driven separatism fundamentally alters the dynamics of democratic development by prioritizing state survival over institutional consolidation. While existing literature often treats democratization and conflict resolution as mutually reinforcing processes, the cases analysed demonstrate that, under conditions of sustained external interference – primarily by Russia – these processes become structurally antagonistic. The study challenges the reliability of standard democracy indices in conflict-affected environments, highlighting discrepancies between formal indicators and empirical realities. It shows that unresolved conflicts redirect economic, institutional, and human resources toward security imperatives, constrain international integration, and enable ruling elites to instrumentalize threats to justify authoritarian practices. At the same time, variation across cases suggests that democratization remains possible where institutional resilience, civil society engagement, and external anchoring – particularly through European integration – are sufficiently strong. The findings underscore the need to incorporate geopolitical context into analyses of democratization in contested states. The paper concludes that institutional reforms alone are insufficient to sustain democratic trajectories in the presence of external destabilization, and that effective democratization requires parallel progress in security, state capacity, and resistance to foreign interference.

Citation: Gretskiy, I., & Gogolashvili, K. (2025). Separatism and Territorial Disputes as Factors Underpinning Democratization and Authoritarianization. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19630734

REDEMOS Policy Paper D4.2, December 2025

Cultural drivers and barriers to democratisation

Madalina Dobrescu & Shukurah Oluwatobi Lawal

This paper examines the role of religious institutions as cultural drivers and barriers to democratisation in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood, focusing on Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. It situates the analysis within broader political culture debates, which emphasise that democratisation is not determined solely by formal institutions or socio-economic development, but also by underlying societal values such as trust, participation, tolerance, and civic engagement.

Keywords: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, EU, Eastern neighbourhood, democratisation, cultural drivers, cultural barriers, democracy

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REDEMOS Policy Paper D4.2, December 2025
Cultural drivers and barriers to democratisation
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This paper examines the role of religious institutions as cultural drivers and barriers to democratisation in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood, focusing on Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. It situates the analysis within broader political culture debates, which emphasise that democratisation is not determined solely by formal institutions or socio-economic development, but also by underlying societal values such as trust, participation, tolerance, and civic engagement. While these values are widely associated with democratic consolidation, the paper argues that their effects are mediated through concrete institutional actors – most notably religious organisations – which shape, translate, and sometimes distort their democratic potential.
The study engages with established political culture and modernisation theories, including Almond and Verba’s “civic culture” framework and Inglehart and Welzel’s “emancipative values” thesis, while also addressing critiques that cultural explanations are overly deterministic or imprecise. It proposes that rather than treating “culture” as an abstract societal attribute, a more productive approach is to examine religious institutions as key intermediaries between values and political behaviour. Churches and Islamic institutions are particularly influential in the eastern neighbourhood due to their historical embeddedness, high levels of public trust, and close association with national identity formation.
Empirically, the paper shows that the role of religious institutions varies significantly across cases. In Armenia, the Armenian Apostolic Church has primarily functioned as a conservative stabiliser and legitimising force for political elites, contributing to national cohesion but limiting liberal democratic reform, particularly in relation to minority rights. In Azerbaijan, Islam is tightly controlled by the state through a system of “official Islam,” which depoliticises religious life and suppresses independent religious mobilisation, thereby reinforcing authoritarian stability by default rather than through active religious agency. In Belarus, the Belarusian Orthodox Church operates within a state-cooperative model that privileges traditional religion while maintaining strong political alignment with the Lukashenko regime. Although individual religious actors occasionally supported protest movements, the institutional Church has largely reinforced narratives of stability and order, contributing indirectly to authoritarian resilience. In Georgia, the Georgian Orthodox Church has played a dual role: it has contributed significantly to social cohesion and national identity, but increasingly acts as a constraint on liberal reforms, particularly in areas such as LGBTQ+ rights and anti-discrimination policies, often influencing legislation through its privileged institutional position. In Moldova, religious influence is deeply entangled with geopolitical divisions between pro-European and pro-Russian orientations. Competing Orthodox jurisdictions have become politically relevant actors, with the dominant church exercising substantial influence over electoral behaviour and public discourse, often resisting reforms associated with European integration and liberal democratic norms. In Ukraine, by contrast, religious pluralism has created a more dynamic and competitive environment in which churches have acted both as facilitators of democratic mobilisation – most visibly during the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan – and as sources of division, particularly where church structures are linked to Russian geopolitical influence.
Across all cases, the paper finds that religious institutions are neither inherently democratic nor authoritarian. Instead, their impact depends on three key factors: their autonomy from the state, the degree of religious pluralism within society, and their embeddedness in broader geopolitical and identity conflicts. Where churches are pluralistic and relatively independent, they are more likely to support civic mobilisation and democratic norms. Where they are closely aligned with state power or embedded in authoritarian governance structures, they tend to reinforce political stability at the expense of liberal democratic development.
The paper concludes that understanding democratisation in the eastern neighbourhood requires moving beyond essentialist claims about religion and instead focusing on the institutional conditions under which religious actors operate. Religious institutions should be understood as powerful cultural intermediaries that can either enable or constrain democratic development depending on how they interact with political authority and societal values.

Citation: Dobrescu, M., & Lawal, S. O. (2025). Cultural drivers and barriers to democratisation. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19630470

REDEMOS Policy Paper D4.2, December 2025

Economic drivers and barriers to democratisation

Maryna Rabinovych, Mihai Țurcanu, & Diana Enachi

This policy paper provides insights into economic drivers and barriers to democratisation in each of the six EU eastern neighbourhood (EN) countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) and at the regional level. It offers seven region-level and fifteen country-specific recommendations regarding the integration of economic considerations into the EU’s democracy promotion policies towards its EN.

Keywords: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine. EU, Eastern neighbourhood, democracisation, economic drivers, economic barriers, democracy

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REDEMOS Policy Paper D4.2, December 2025
Economic drivers and barriers to democratisation
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This policy paper provides insights into economic drivers and barriers to democratisation in each of the six EU eastern neighbourhood (EN) countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) and at the regional level. It offers seven region-level and fifteen country-specific recommendations regarding the integration of economic considerations into the EU’s democracy promotion policies towards its EN.
At the regional level, the paper suggests that the EU takes long-term fragmentation as a starting point for developing any policies vis-à-vis the region. It is recommended to approach the deepening of economic ties with most of the EN countries through a strategic lens, and thus as an investment into the EU’s ability to withstand the rapidly growing geoeconomic competition with Russia and China. Whilst preserving the Eastern Partnership (EaP) as a region-wide forum for dialogue and engagement is recommended, the EU should also be encouraged, to the extent possible, to foster in a much more concerted and systematic manner intra-regional economic integration, for instance, involving Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan under the auspices of the Organization for Democracy and Development (GUAM). Both economic potential and democracy in the EN region can be also encouraged through the development of EU- and EU member state-level reintegration support programmes for highly-qualified professionals, originating from the region, and continued funding of educational and capacity-building programmes for small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) leaders in the region. Finally, the paper argues to consider – whenever the political circumstances allow – engaging in dialogue with national authorities in EN countries on the improvement and change of national immigration and residence policies for the purpose of attracting human capital from other world regions (e.g. Central and Southeast Asia, Latin America) to move to the EN on a temporal or permanent basis, not least with a view to fill knowledge and expertise gaps and enhance innovation capacity.

The study engages with established political culture and modernisation theories, including Almond and Verba’s “civic culture” framework and Inglehart and Welzel’s “emancipative values” thesis, while also addressing critiques that cultural explanations are overly deterministic or imprecise. It proposes that rather than treating “culture” as an abstract societal attribute, a more productive approach is to examine religious institutions as key intermediaries between values and political behaviour. Churches and Islamic institutions are particularly influential in the eastern neighbourhood due to their historical embeddedness, high levels of public trust, and close association with national identity formation.
Empirically, the paper shows that the role of religious institutions varies significantly across cases. In Armenia, the Armenian Apostolic Church has primarily functioned as a conservative stabiliser and legitimising force for political elites, contributing to national cohesion but limiting liberal democratic reform, particularly in relation to minority rights. In Azerbaijan, Islam is tightly controlled by the state through a system of “official Islam,” which depoliticises religious life and suppresses independent religious mobilisation, thereby reinforcing authoritarian stability by default rather than through active religious agency. In Belarus, the Belarusian Orthodox Church operates within a state-cooperative model that privileges traditional religion while maintaining strong political alignment with the Lukashenko regime. Although individual religious actors occasionally supported protest movements, the institutional Church has largely reinforced narratives of stability and order, contributing indirectly to authoritarian resilience. In Georgia, the Georgian Orthodox Church has played a dual role: it has contributed significantly to social cohesion and national identity, but increasingly acts as a constraint on liberal reforms, particularly in areas such as LGBTQ+ rights and anti-discrimination policies, often influencing legislation through its privileged institutional position. In Moldova, religious influence is deeply entangled with geopolitical divisions between pro-European and pro-Russian orientations. Competing Orthodox jurisdictions have become politically relevant actors, with the dominant church exercising substantial influence over electoral behaviour and public discourse, often resisting reforms associated with European integration and liberal democratic norms. In Ukraine, by contrast, religious pluralism has created a more dynamic and competitive environment in which churches have acted both as facilitators of democratic mobilisation – most visibly during the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan – and as sources of division, particularly where church structures are linked to Russian geopolitical influence.
Across all cases, the paper finds that religious institutions are neither inherently democratic nor authoritarian. Instead, their impact depends on three key factors: their autonomy from the state, the degree of religious pluralism within society, and their embeddedness in broader geopolitical and identity conflicts. Where churches are pluralistic and relatively independent, they are more likely to support civic mobilisation and democratic norms. Where they are closely aligned with state power or embedded in authoritarian governance structures, they tend to reinforce political stability at the expense of liberal democratic development.
The paper concludes that understanding democratisation in the eastern neighbourhood requires moving beyond essentialist claims about religion and instead focusing on the institutional conditions under which religious actors operate. Religious institutions should be understood as powerful cultural intermediaries that can either enable or constrain democratic development depending on how they interact with political authority and societal values.

Citation: Rabinovych, M., Țurcanu, M., & Enachi, D. (2025). Economic drivers and barriers to democratisation. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19630259

REDEMOS Policy Paper D4.2, December 2025

Social drivers and barriers to democratisation

Ragnar Weilandt, Zachary Fabos & Katharine Khamhaengwong

This paper examines various elements related to the structure of society and the public sphere in the countries of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. In doing so, it explores key social drivers and barriers to democratisation. It identifies civil society as a crucial force in each country, though its nature, scope, challenges, and impact varies significantly across them.

Keywords: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, EU, Eastern neighbourhood, democratisation, social drivers, social barriers, democracy

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REDEMOS Policy Paper D4.2, December 2025
Social drivers and barriers to democratisation
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This paper examines various elements related to the structure of society and the public sphere in the countries of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. In doing so, it explores key social drivers and barriers to democratisation. It identifies civil society as a crucial force in each country, though its nature, scope, challenges, and impact varies significantly across them.

Citation: Weilandt, R., Fabos, Z., & Khamhaengwong, K. (2025). Social drivers and barriers to democratisation. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19614042

REDEMOS Policy Paper D5.1a

Regime clusters and challenges to democratisation in the eastern neighbourhood: Azerbaijan and Belarus

Marianne Kneuer & Murad Nasibov

This policy paper explores where and how authoritarian control is most persistently entrenched. Rather than analysing causal factors of entrenchment, the paper identifies the institutional arenas where democratic governance is most constrained, offering a diagnostic basis for context-aware democracy support. For that purpose, our analysis offers a regime-sensitive analysis of autocratisation in the Eastern Neighbourhood (EN) region, focusing on Azerbaijan and Belarus – the two long-term closed autocracies in the EN.

Keywords: democracy, democratisation, democracy promotion, EU, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Eastern neighbourhood, regime type

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REDEMOS Policy Paper D5.1a
Regime clusters and challenges to democratisation in the eastern neighbourhood: Azerbaijan and Belarus
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This policy paper explores where and how authoritarian control is most persistently entrenched. Rather than analysing causal factors of entrenchment, the paper identifies the institutional arenas where democratic governance is most constrained, offering a diagnostic basis for context-aware democracy support. For that purpose, our analysis offers a regime-sensitive analysis of autocratisation in the Eastern Neighbourhood (EN) region, focusing on Azerbaijan and Belarus – the two long-term closed autocracies in the EN. Drawing on a comparative framework, we identify the historical and institutional features that reflect – rather than explain – the long-term persistence of authoritarian control. In doing so, this paper follows two basic premises: first, a regime-sensitive perspective needs to take into consideration the overall dynamic, and second, the direction of the regime development. This constitutes a critical and basic assessment for policymakers and their democracy support strategies and actions.

In a separate policy paper1, the focus lies on cases of potential democratisation in Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, identifying specific areas of democratic backsliding and tailored, time-sensitive strategies to support democratic consolidation in each country. The differentiation of these two clusters relies on the direction of change in regime quality – the long-term tendency in the Liberal Democracy Index (LDI) towards the democratic end of the political regime spectrum, observed in the cases of Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, while Belarus and Azerbaijan are clearly outliers as closed autocracies in the EN region.

Both policy papers apply the framework of regime states developed by Buscanenau and Kneuer (2024), which links regime types offered by Lührmann et al. (2018) – closed autocracy (CA), electoral autocracy (EA), electoral democracy (ED), and liberal democracy (LD) – to dynamic regime states, including stasis, upturns and downturns, and progressions and regressions. This approach enables a more granular diagnosis of regime quality and political trajectories. Additionally, the analysis draws on expert and policy assessments, which strengthen the plausibility and contextual relevance of the findings. These sources help anchor the regime classifications in recent political developments and ensure that the framework reflects on-the-ground realities. This combination of conceptual precision and empirical grounding enhances the face validity and practical utility of the overall approach.

The paper finds that both Azerbaijan and Belarus are entrenched in CA regime stasis. The qualitative analysis reveals that CA stasis in both countries is characterised by distinct institutional weaknesses: in Azerbaijan, it stems from judicial subordination, executive dominance, electoral manipulation, and voter intimidation; in Belarus, from severe civil society repression, restricted civic space, curtailed academic freedom, and politically controlled courts. The comparative analysis of Azerbaijan and Belarus shows that autocratisation in the region is neither uniform nor ideologically monolithic but varies in institutional configuration, temporal trajectory, and regime practice. These cases illustrate that although the regime type (CA) is shared, the regime state — that is, the direction, rhythm, and institutional coherence of autocratic control — differs markedly. Democracy support must therefore account not only for what kind of regime exists but also for how its closure is maintained and where engagement may be feasible.

The paper traces the specific institutional logics underpinning authoritarian resilience. By identifying the lowest-performing areas during each country’s CA periods of stasis—measured by indicators of the LDI by Varieties of Democracy (Coppedge et al. 2024)—we isolate domains that are most consistently constrained within each regime. Even though they might not be the most contributing factors to the overall LDI indicator, these “lowest-performing areas” are the aspects of democratic governance most suppressed by authoritarian regimes, revealing where authoritarian control is most persistently entrenched and thus where resilience is institutionally rooted. However, our diagnostics of most entrenched aspects of these authoritarian regimes do not assert or rule out that other dimensions of governance have likewise contributed to sustaining CA and therefore should be viewed as insignificant. The identified areas can thus only be seen as binding constraints or persistent weaknesses. Our study shows that, even in cases of countries with authoritarian stasis, there can be different reasons, that is: different aspects that contribute to this authoritarian persistence.

Crucially, this study proves wrong one-size-fits-all solutions and enables to tackle in a more precise way the vulnerabilities of individual authoritarian regimes. It offers the EU a regime-sensitive diagnostic tool to assess authoritarian durability, identify realistic entry points, and minimise the risk of reinforcing repression through miscalibrated pressure. In Azerbaijan, the EU should adopt a dual-track approach that combines incremental institutional reform with support for civil society and mid-level bureaucrats. To strengthen the independence of the judiciary, the EU should prioritise the promotion of merit-based appointments, transparent disciplinary procedures, and legal training for the judiciary. The currently ongoing reforms of the judiciary can offer entry points for the EU. For free and fair elections, the EU should continue actively promoting and supporting electoral reform via a revised Election Code, inclusive of the Election Commission and dispute resolution mechanisms. Simultaneously, the EU should build the local capacity of civil society and political parties in election monitoring and addressing electoral intimidation. Facilitating a constructive dialogue among civil society actors and oppositional parties is key to the successful exercise of election monitoring and addressing electoral intimidation. Last but not least, the EU should expand its portfolio of programmes supporting the young, professional bureaucracy that has emerged in the recent period.

In Belarus, the EU should pursue a calibrated strategy focused on empowering exiled civic actors, bridging between the civil society in exile and the remaining democratic actors in the country, and preparing for a democratic transition. This involves scaling diaspora hubs into support platforms, funding informal civic networks, and preventing Government-Organised Non-Governmental Organisation (GONGO) co-optation. Academic and cultural autonomy should be restored through a dedicated Academic Freedom Fund, digital platforms, and partnerships for scholar reintegration. Judicial reform efforts should support independent appointments, due process, and transitional justice planning. The EU is also called to promote CSO legal reform, support unregistered initiatives, and fund civic infrastructure, including crowdfunding platforms and memory projects. Quiet, long-term engagement—rather than broad sanctions—will better equip Berlarusian democratic forces (as well as their Azerbaijani counterparts) for eventual democratic re-entry and enable the EU to deliver targeted, regime-sensitive democracy support.

Citation: KKneuer, M., & Nasibov, M. (2025). Regime clusters and challenges to democratisation in the eastern neighbourhood: Azerbaijan and Belarus. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17937429

REDEMOS Policy Paper D5.1b

Regime clusters and challenges to democratisation in the eastern neighbourhood: Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine

Vassilis Karokis-Mavrikos, Theofanis Exadaktylos & Laura Chappell (eds.)

The REDEMOS Policy Paper D5.1b examines the challenges and requirements of democratic consolidation across Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Developed alongside D5.1a, it seeks to sharpen the strategic focus of EU democracy support by advocating for a regime-sensitive approach grounded in the most up-to-date trajectories of democratic development.

Keywords: democracy, democratisation, democracy promotion, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, EU, regime type

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REDEMOS Policy Paper D5.1b
Regime clusters and challenges to democratisation in the eastern neighbourhood: Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine
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The REDEMOS Policy Paper D5.1b examines the challenges and requirements of democratic consolidation across Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Developed alongside D5.1a, it seeks to sharpen the strategic focus of EU democracy support by advocating for a regime-sensitive approach grounded in the most up-to-date trajectories of democratic development.

The analysis builds on the regime state typology introduced in D5.2, which assesses political regimes according to three key dimensions: (a) their position on the autocracy-democracy continuum; (b) whether the regime is in a static or dynamic condition; and if dynamic, (c) the direction and nature of regime change. Drawing on data from the V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index (LDI), the paper traces the evolution of regime states between 1990 and 2023 in the four countries, with a particular focus on identifying the most recent regime states and significant developments between 2022 and 2023 that may not yet have resulted in formal regime state reclassification.

Asserting that policy action must be tailored to contemporary regime dynamics, the paper complements LDI data with expert country input. Experts were asked to review descriptive rankings of LDI component indicators, based on their average values over the most recent regime-state period, in order to identify persistently weaker or recently weakening areas of democratic performance. This approach serves a diagnostic rather than explanatory purpose: it does not assess which indicators contribute most to the overall LDI, but instead highlights those dimensions where democratic performance remains consistently fragile or has recently declined. Using these diagnostics, experts formulated policy-relevant recommendations aligned with country-specific institutional realities. Through this multi-method design, the paper offers timely policy advice for EU and national policymakers, reflecting context-sensitive dynamics and capturing the differing status quos in the region’s paths toward democratisation.

The findings reveal four distinct regime trajectories. Armenia has experienced democratic backsliding since 2020, reflected in persistently weaker judicial independence, electoral trust deficits, and increased media censorship. Georgia remained stable until 2022 but is now undergoing democratic deterioration, visible in declining media pluralism, growing government disinformation, and restrictions on civil society. Moldova demonstrated democratic gains from 2019 to 2022, particularly in electoral and judicial domains, but has since shown signs of regression due to implementation gaps and limited governance effectiveness. Ukraine, under wartime conditions, has shown institutional resilience and overall LDI improvement, though persistent challenges around executive dominance and judicial politicisation remain.

To respond effectively, the EU must tailor its democracy support to each country’s regime state, understood as both context-specific and time-sensitive. Armenia requires renewed focus on electoral reform, judicial independence, and media freedom. In Georgia, restoring institutional checks and reversing legislative restrictions on civil society and the media are urgent. Moldova needs deeper support for judicial accountability and administrative reform, anchored in enforceable conditionality. Ukraine, despite progress, demands sustained EU engagement in judicial reform, executive oversight, and institutional depoliticisation, particularly to consolidate gains in a post-conflict future.

Across all four cases, the EU must invest in watchdog institutions, reinforce political conditionality, and strengthen links between local actors and European standards. Democracy assistance must be principled but pragmatic, adapting to regime-specific realities while ensuring long-term accountability and resilience.

Citation: Karokis-Mavrikos, V., Exadaktylos, T., & Chappell, L. (2025). Regime clusters and challenges to democratisation in the eastern neighbourhood: Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17937515

REDEMOS Policy Paper D6.1, October 2025

The role of the United States in the political transition of the EU's eastern neighbourhood

Kakha Gogolashvili & Eka Metreveli

U.S. democracy assistance in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood (EN) region has varied in scope, consistency, and effectiveness across countries, shaped by both geopolitical priorities and domestic political conditions. Overall, the impact of assistance is context-dependent, most effective in semi-open systems with strong domestic demand for reform. By adjusting strategies to reward democratic gains and respond to backsliding, U.S. aid has proven instrumental in building civil society resilience and institutional safeguards, even if its influence remains constrained in closed regimes.

Keywords: US democracy assistance, democracy, EU eastern neighbourhood, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus

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REDEMOS Policy Paper D6.1
The role of the United States in the political transition of the EU's eastern neighbourhood
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U.S. democracy assistance in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood (EN) region has varied in scope, consistency, and effectiveness across countries, shaped by both geopolitical priorities and domestic political conditions. Overall, the impact of assistance is context-dependent, most effective in semi-open systems with strong domestic demand for reform. By adjusting strategies to reward democratic gains and respond to backsliding, U.S. aid has proven instrumental in building civil society resilience and institutional safeguards, even if its influence remains constrained in closed regimes.

Keywords: US democracy assistance, democracy, EU eastern neighbourhood, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus
Citation: Gogolashvili, K., & Metreveli, E. (2025). The role of the United States in the political transition of the EU's eastern neighbourhood. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17341441

REDEMOS Policy Paper D6.1, January 2025

The role of China in the political transition of the EU’s eastern neighbourhood

Julia Bader

This paper explores the role of China in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood countries since the end of the Cold War and analyses how China has affected the political structures of these states. All EU eastern neighbourhood countries have actively sought China’s political and economic engagement as a counterbalance to Russian influence and to mitigate EU conditionality or the feeling that integration into the EU would be out of reach. China, with its agenda of undermining democratic norms at the international level, which it is articulating increasingly assertively, creates a challenge to the EU’s normative agenda of democracy promotion in the EU eastern neighbourhood.

Keywords: China, Eastern neighbourhood, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan Belt and Road Initiative, Economic linkage, Diffusion of surveillance technology, Corruption, EU foreign policy

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REDEMOS Policy Paper D6.1
The role of China in the political transition of the EU’s eastern neighbourhood
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In comparison to Russia, which has been trying to retain pre-eminence over the post-Soviet space and to prevent the EU’s eastern neighbours from moving closer to the EU, China is a relatively new player in the region. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, China was primarily interested in military technology from Ukraine. Only with the inception of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013 did China discover the Eastern European and South Caucasus countries for their geographic location along the BRI that connects China with Western Europe.


This paper explores the role of China in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood countries since the end of the Cold War and analyses how China has affected the political structures of these states. All EU eastern neighbourhood countries have actively sought China’s political and economic engagement as a counterbalance to Russian influence and to mitigate EU conditionality or the feeling that integration into the EU would be out of reach. China, with its agenda of undermining democratic norms at the international level, which it is articulating increasingly assertively, creates a challenge to the EU’s normative agenda of democracy promotion in the EU eastern neighbourhood.


However, China’s direct impact on the countries’ political structures is still limited and indirect. Politically, China has not been a reliable partner as far as the EU’s eastern neighbourhood countries’ territorial conflicts with Russia are concerned. Rather than pursuing a regime change agenda in these countries, China pursues narrow economic objectives, and even its economic presence is comparatively limited. Trade with China has increased, but except for Ukraine, this led to large trade imbalances for them. There is some evidence of mismanagement, elite capture and corruption in Chinese investment projects. At the same time, infrastructure construction with Chinese companies have often been financed by (international) lenders other than China. China is facilitating the normalisation and diffusion of digital dual-use surveillance technologies, even to contexts where the protection of individual rights is weak. Finally, China has increased its outreach to citizens through media and educational institutions in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood countries with a China-friendly narrative that is critical of the West.

Keywords: China, Eastern neighbourhood, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan Belt and Road Initiative, Economic linkage, Diffusion of surveillance technology, Corruption, EU foreign policy
Citation: Bader, J. (2025). The role of China in the political transition of the EU's eastern neighbourhood. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14725196

REDEMOS Policy Paper D6.1, January 2025

The role of Russia in the political transition of the EU’s eastern neighbourhood

Igor Gretskiy

A thorough examination, conducted in the framework of this policy paper, suggests that the Kremlin’s overarching strategy and tactical manoeuvres are unlikely to undergo substantial alterations, particularly in the medium term, as they are deeply rooted in the peculiarities of the institutional design of Russian society, politics, and economy. Drawing from the analysis and with the goal of effectively mitigating Russia’s influence in the EN space, this policy paper recommends promoting Europe as a security provider; advancing new strategic messaging; and adopting the principles of no grey zones in Europe and zero tolerance towards Russian propaganda. In certain parts, this research extends beyond REDEMOS’ chronological scope to highlight and emphasize the continuity of Russia’s foreign policy towards its neighbours since the collapse of the USSR.

Keywords: Russia, Eastern neighbourhood, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Information warfare, Russian propaganda, Economic coercion, Nuclear sabre-rattling, Strategic messaging, EU foreign policy

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REDEMOS Policy Paper D6.1
The role of Russia in the political transition of the EU’s eastern neighbourhood
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The Russian political establishment has always been convinced that Russia’s national interests as a “great power” extend beyond its borders and that the post-Soviet space is a territory of Russia’s exclusive geopolitical domination. Моscow, therefore, immediately characterized the EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative as a project aimed to project the EU’s soft power onto its neighbouring countries and reduce their dependence on Russian influence.

The central aim of Russia’s strategy concerning the EU’s eastern neighborhood (EN) countries is the erosion of their sovereignty and the attainment of de facto control over decision-making in their external and internal affairs. Moreover, the Kremlin is clearly focused on undermining the attractive image of the EU – and the West as a whole – among the populations of the EN countries. To accomplish its goals, the Kremlin most often resort to information warfare (or soft influence through the Russian media presence in the EN countries and the promotion of narratives through institutions such as Rossotrudnichestvo and the Russkiy Mir Foundation), economic blackmail, and hard power. In pursuit of its foreign policy objectives, Russia employs an extensive array of instruments, weaponising virtually all forms of interaction with neighbouring countries. The Kremlin relies on instruments of negative motivation, such as fostering separatism, exploiting hard security vulnerabilities, employing economic coercion, and engaging in nuclear sabre-rattling.

A thorough examination, conducted in the framework of this policy paper, suggests that the Kremlin’s overarching strategy and tactical manoeuvres are unlikely to undergo substantial alterations, particularly in the medium term, as they are deeply rooted in the peculiarities of the institutional design of Russian society, politics, and economy. Drawing from the analysis and with the goal of effectively mitigating Russia’s influence in the EN space, this policy paper recommends promoting Europe as a security provider; advancing new strategic messaging; and adopting the principles of no grey zones in Europe and zero tolerance towards Russian propaganda. In certain parts, this research extends beyond REDEMOS’ chronological scope to highlight and emphasize the continuity of Russia’s foreign policy towards its neighbours since the collapse of the USSR.

Keywords: Russia, Eastern neighbourhood, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Information warfare, Russian propaganda, Economic coercion, Nuclear sabre-rattling, Strategic messaging, EU foreign policy
Citation: Gretskiy, I. (2025). The role of Russia in the political transition of the EU's eastern neighbourhood. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14725066

REDEMOS Policy Paper D7.5

Design and communication of EU democracy support

Alexander Geisler, Maja Mandić & Tina Freyburg

This policy brief presents key findings from an original elite survey (N=61) of EU representatives in Brussels working on relations with its Eastern partner countries, that is Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Conducted between October 2024 and May 2025, the survey captures officials’ assessments of the EU’s external image in the region, as well as their preferences regarding democracy promotion instruments and engagement with Eastern counterparts.

Keywords: EU, democracy support, perceptions, policy design, diplomacy, Eastern neighbourhood, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine

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REDEMOS Policy Paper D7.5
Design and communication of EU democracy support
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This policy brief presents key findings from an original elite survey (N=61) of EU representatives in Brussels working on relations with its Eastern partner countries, that is Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Conducted between October 2024 and May 2025, the survey captures officials’ assessments of the EU’s external image in the region, as well as their preferences regarding democracy promotion instruments and engagement with Eastern counterparts.

The findings show that EU officials’ instrument choices are shaped not only by assessments of what works on the ground, but also by how they believe the EU itself is perceived by their counterparts in the partner countries. While support for transactional, incentive-based tools (e.g., financial and technical assistance, high-level visits, election monitoring, and membership-related incentives) remains consistently high across respondents, support for declaratory instruments (e.g., public statements or thematic conferences) declines markedly among officials who believe the EU is seen as a constrained and less credible actor.

The results highlight the importance of reflexive, perception-aware diplomacy and point to concrete ways to strengthen the acceptance, credibility, and effectiveness of EU democracy promotion in the Eastern partner countries. Practically, this means that strengthening EU democracy promotion requires pairing public signaling more systematically with visible follow-through, prioritising incentive-based engagement where credibility is fragile, and improving internal coordination so that EU messages and actions reinforce rather than undermine each other.

Citation: Geisler, A., Mandić, M., & Freyburg, T. (2025). Design and communication of EU democracy support. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.18619591
  • This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon Europe research and innovation
    programme under grant agreement No 101061738. The Associated Partner University of Surrey has received
    funding from UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) under the UK government’s Horizon Europe funding guarantee
    under grant number 10040721. The Associated Partner University of St. Gallen has received funding from the Swiss
    State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation(SERI). Views and opinions expressed are however those
    of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union, UKRI and SERI.

    Neither the European Union nor UKRI or SERI can be held responsible for them.