REDEMOS Policy Paper D3.3, February 2025
Trends, patterns and coordination in the EU, Member States’ and international institutions’ assistance to the eastern neighbourhood countries
Maryna Rabinovych & Stiven Kimmel
Keywords: Eastern neighbourhood, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, EU, democracy funding, democracy assistance, democracy aid, humanitarian aid, Official Development Aid (ODA), OECD
REDEMOS Policy Paper D3.3
Trends, patterns and coordination in the EU, Member States’ and international institutions’ assistance to the eastern neighbourhood countries
Keywords: Eastern neighbourhood, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, EU, democracy funding, democracy assistance, democracy aid, humanitarian aid, Official Development Aid (ODA), OECD
As the third deliverable of Work Package 3, the main objective of which is to collect and analyse data on democracy funding by the European Union (EU), EU member states and other international donors, this policy paper offers policy recommendations based on the analysis of patterns and trends of democracy funding in the EU’s six EN countries, as provided by the EU and its member states between 2005 and 2022. When relevant, it also draws parallels with the patterns and trends, characteristic for the assistance, provided by the United States (USA) (as the largest bilateral donor in the region) and international organisation, selected based on their engagement in the democratisation efforts in the region, including, amongst others, the International Development Association, the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund and the International Labour Organisation. The paper is based on descriptive statistics, derived from the dataset of democracy assistance to the EU’s EN countries, developed by REDEMOS.1 The dataset was developed based on the data on financial flows provided under the framework of Official Development Assistance (ODA), reported by the European Commission to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) between 2005 and 2022, and includes 1474 entries. Thereby 222 relate to projects, funded by the European Commission, 646 by member states, 416 to the USA and 155 to international organisations.
The analysis presents six recommendations. First, based on the REDEMOS’ experience of working with the dataset, it highlights the need to introduce unified standards as to the scope of data on EU and member states’ democracy assistance projects, reported through the OECD library, as well as their classification. This is necessary, since existing differences in the way projects are described may influence their classification and, more broadly, even whether they at all are classified as democracy assistance.
Second, the analysis underscores the importance of the alignment of funding priorities and coordination on the substance of democracy projects between the EU, its member states and other actors, active in the EN region. Alongside the notable increase in overall democracy assistance for the region, this recommendation makes sense amidst the multiplicity of in democracy models, promoted by donors in the region, and difference in the degree to which they engage with related concepts, such as good governance, human rights, the rule of law and gender equality.
Third, the analysis points to the need for the EU and member states to stronger engage and support the electoral model of democracy in EN partner countries. Though free and fair elections lie at the heart of democracy and notwithstanding the rise of the external interference challenge, support to the electoral model of democracy received the smallest amount of support compared to all other models.
Fourth, this paper stresses the role of continuity of donor engagement with certain topics to ensure its effectiveness. The dataset reveals multiple instances of relatively small projects (below USD 1 million) implemented by donors in certain thematic areas (e.g. civil society support, women’s rights) within one of the EN countries. However, many of these initiatives were not followed up, limiting their long-term impact.
Fifth, the paper draws attention to the positive case of EU and member states’ multi-stakeholder support to Ukraine’s decentralisation reform and local empowerment as a potential model for long-term support of priority reforms in partner countries in the EN region and beyond. It is shown that the focus on a priority thematic area within a multi-stakeholder format allows for effective coordination between donors based on their specialisation and networks in a given partner country.
Finally, it is emphasized that long-termism and continuity should not be treated as imperatives, allowing for a fair balance between stability and adaptability in response to changes within partner countries and a turbulent geopolitical environment. Portfolio assessment is recommended as a tool to investigate the interplay in the impact various EU and member states’ initiatives have within dynamically evolving domestic and geopolitical policy contexts.
Citation: Rabinovych, M., & Kimmel, S. (2025). Trends, patterns and coordination in the EU, Member States' and international institutions' assistance to the eastern neighbourhood countries. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14794746
REDEMOS Policy Paper D6.1, January 2025
The role of China in the political transition of the EU’s eastern neighbourhood
Julia Bader
This paper explores the role of China in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood countries since the end of the Cold War and analyses how China has affected the political structures of these states. All EU eastern neighbourhood countries have actively sought China’s political and economic engagement as a counterbalance to Russian influence and to mitigate EU conditionality or the feeling that integration into the EU would be out of reach. China, with its agenda of undermining democratic norms at the international level, which it is articulating increasingly assertively, creates a challenge to the EU’s normative agenda of democracy promotion in the EU eastern neighbourhood.
Keywords: China, Eastern neighbourhood, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan Belt and Road Initiative, Economic linkage, Diffusion of surveillance technology, Corruption, EU foreign policy
REDEMOS Policy Paper D6.1
The role of China in the political transition of the EU’s eastern neighbourhood
In comparison to Russia, which has been trying to retain pre-eminence over the post-Soviet space and to prevent the EU’s eastern neighbours from moving closer to the EU, China is a relatively new player in the region. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, China was primarily interested in military technology from Ukraine. Only with the inception of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013 did China discover the Eastern European and South Caucasus countries for their geographic location along the BRI that connects China with Western Europe.
This paper explores the role of China in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood countries since the end of the Cold War and analyses how China has affected the political structures of these states. All EU eastern neighbourhood countries have actively sought China’s political and economic engagement as a counterbalance to Russian influence and to mitigate EU conditionality or the feeling that integration into the EU would be out of reach. China, with its agenda of undermining democratic norms at the international level, which it is articulating increasingly assertively, creates a challenge to the EU’s normative agenda of democracy promotion in the EU eastern neighbourhood.
However, China’s direct impact on the countries’ political structures is still limited and indirect. Politically, China has not been a reliable partner as far as the EU’s eastern neighbourhood countries’ territorial conflicts with Russia are concerned. Rather than pursuing a regime change agenda in these countries, China pursues narrow economic objectives, and even its economic presence is comparatively limited. Trade with China has increased, but except for Ukraine, this led to large trade imbalances for them. There is some evidence of mismanagement, elite capture and corruption in Chinese investment projects. At the same time, infrastructure construction with Chinese companies have often been financed by (international) lenders other than China. China is facilitating the normalisation and diffusion of digital dual-use surveillance technologies, even to contexts where the protection of individual rights is weak. Finally, China has increased its outreach to citizens through media and educational institutions in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood countries with a China-friendly narrative that is critical of the West.
Keywords: China, Eastern neighbourhood, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan Belt and Road Initiative, Economic linkage, Diffusion of surveillance technology, Corruption, EU foreign policy
Citation: Bader, J. (2025). The role of China in the political transition of the EU's eastern neighbourhood. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.14725196
REDEMOS Policy Paper D6.1, January 2025
The role of Russia in the political transition of the EU’s eastern neighbourhood
Igor Gretskiy
Keywords: Russia, Eastern neighbourhood, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Information warfare, Russian propaganda, Economic coercion, Nuclear sabre-rattling, Strategic messaging, EU foreign policy
REDEMOS Policy Paper D6.1
The role of Russia in the political transition of the EU’s eastern neighbourhood
The Russian political establishment has always been convinced that Russia’s national interests as a “great power” extend beyond its borders and that the post-Soviet space is a territory of Russia’s exclusive geopolitical domination. Моscow, therefore, immediately characterized the EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative as a project aimed to project the EU’s soft power onto its neighbouring countries and reduce their dependence on Russian influence.
The central aim of Russia’s strategy concerning the EU’s eastern neighborhood (EN) countries is the erosion of their sovereignty and the attainment of de facto control over decision-making in their external and internal affairs. Moreover, the Kremlin is clearly focused on undermining the attractive image of the EU – and the West as a whole – among the populations of the EN countries. To accomplish its goals, the Kremlin most often resort to information warfare (or soft influence through the Russian media presence in the EN countries and the promotion of narratives through institutions such as Rossotrudnichestvo and the Russkiy Mir Foundation), economic blackmail, and hard power. In pursuit of its foreign policy objectives, Russia employs an extensive array of instruments, weaponising virtually all forms of interaction with neighbouring countries. The Kremlin relies on instruments of negative motivation, such as fostering separatism, exploiting hard security vulnerabilities, employing economic coercion, and engaging in nuclear sabre-rattling.
A thorough examination, conducted in the framework of this policy paper, suggests that the Kremlin’s overarching strategy and tactical manoeuvres are unlikely to undergo substantial alterations, particularly in the medium term, as they are deeply rooted in the peculiarities of the institutional design of Russian society, politics, and economy. Drawing from the analysis and with the goal of effectively mitigating Russia’s influence in the EN space, this policy paper recommends promoting Europe as a security provider; advancing new strategic messaging; and adopting the principles of no grey zones in Europe and zero tolerance towards Russian propaganda. In certain parts, this research extends beyond REDEMOS’ chronological scope to highlight and emphasize the continuity of Russia’s foreign policy towards its neighbours since the collapse of the USSR.