Trends and patterns in democracy assistance to the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood between 2005-2022
Maryna Rabinovych and Stiven Kimmel
Strategic Clarity & Resolve: Confronting Russia in the European Neighbourhood
Igor Gretskiy
Over the past five years, Official Development Assistance (ODA) to the EU’s six eastern neighborhood countries has steadily increased. Yet, the EU and its member states, collectively the world’s largest ODA donors, face challenges in effectively coordinating aid due to the multiplicity of donors and their differing priorities. Ensuring coherent democracy assistance is particularly complex, given the contested nature of democracy assistance itself and Russia’s destabilising influence in the region. Effective governance of democracy aid requires a shared understanding of democracy models and its intersection with related concepts like human rights, rule of law, and gender equality.
With a view to provide greater clarity to these challenges, the REDEMOS research team has analysed democracy funding patterns in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood, based on a dataset which covers 1.474 democracy assistance projects from 2005 to 2022. The dataset includes contributions from EU institutions (USD 184.25 million), EU member states (USD 146.62 million), the USA (USD 139.07 million), and international organisations (USD 26.33 million). The analysis categorises democracy aid into six models— lectoral, liberal, participatory, egalitarian, peacebuilding, and feminist—while also considering funding for good governance, human rights, and rule of law projects.
The findings highlight the need for improved donor coordination, standardised reporting, and sustained engagement in priority areas to maximise the impact of democracy assistance in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood.
The Russian political establishment has always perceived the collapse of the Soviet Union not as an opportunity to embark on a process towards full-blown democratisation, but as the embodiment of the USSR’s defeat and, consequently, the West’s victory in the Cold War. In general, small and medium-sized neighbouring states are seen by the Kremlin as inherently dependent objects of influence of major powers, while the EU’s eastern neighbourhood, in particular, is regarded as an exclusive space of Russia’s “special responsibility” and as such as an integral component of its self-perceived great power status.
Essentially, Russia has embraced the old Soviet concept of “limited sovereignty”, openly denying the EU’s eastern neighbourhood countries the right to independently determine their foreign policy course. This approach has manifested itself in Russia’s military aggression against Georgia and Ukraine, as well as in its hybrid subversive activities targeting every EU eastern neighbourhood country. Moreover, the Kremlin’s ultimatum of 17 December 2021, demanding from the West to provide Russia legal security guarantees, indicates that its geopolitical ambitions extend far beyond the EU eastern neighbourhood. Under these circumstances, EU member states must adapt their foreign policy to bolster their own security, as well as to help EU eastern neighbourhood countries resist Russia’s attempts to undermine their sovereignty and territorial integrity.
China, while still a relatively new actor, has already positioned itself as an influential player in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood, in contrast to Russia, which has the historical advantage of regional dominance. China’s engagement reveals its economic ambitions and strategic pragmatism, anchored by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The EU’s eastern neighbourhood countries have proactively looked to China, seeing it not only as a source of economic investment—alternative to the EU—but also as a geopolitical counterbalance to Russian influence. China’s political clout in the region, however, remains indirect and limited, suggesting Beijing’s unreliability as a partner, in particular regarding territorial conflicts.
Yet, China’s economic engagement in the six countries poses a significant challenge to the EU’s normative goals, leading to trade imbalances and elite capture, as well as exacerbating vulnerabilities in governance practices. Through media influence and partnerships with educational institutions, China promotes Beijing- friendly narratives and disseminates a discourse that undermines liberal democratic norms. China is also actively promoting its dual-use safety and surveillance technology, making them affordable, and normalizing the use of intrusive applications. Once in place, they risk being used for repressive purposes. By projecting and utilising its soft power, as well as offering economic opportunities without conditions such as stringent reforms, China is able to challenge the EU’s efforts in the region, while reinforcing authoritarian norms and tendencies. In addition, China’s stance with regard to Russia’s aggression further undermines regional security—and thus the security of EU member states.
