by Mihai-Razvan Corman*
In the presidential runoff on Sunday, Maia Sandu, Moldova’s incumbent pro-European president seeking re-election, prevailed over the pro-Russia candidate Alexandr Stoianoglo, securing 55.35% of the vote. In the context of the nearly failed EU referendum two weeks before, Russian interference in the election process and internal grievances amid economic hardship and stalled justice and anti-corruption reforms, Sandu faced an uphill battle at a time when the stakes are high.
This election was crucial for Moldova’s future European integration. Before her election in November 2020, Maia Sandu was the leader of the pro-European PAS (Party for Action and Solidarity) which won a landslide victory in the 2021 parliamentary elections, governing the country ever since. Sandu still enjoys far-reaching influence in the party, extending beyond her formal presidential powers. Her defeat at this autumn’s presidential elections would have been a vote of no confidence towards the current PAS-led government and forecasted unfavourable prospects with respect to the equally consequential 2025 parliamentary elections. Moreover, it would have strengthened the domestic pro-Russia faction and sent a clear message to Brussels and EU Member States capitals that Moldovans turn down the historic opportunity for EU accession created by Russia’s invasion in Ukraine.
Against this backdrop, both the pro-EU camp in Moldova and its allies in Brussels reacted with big sighs of relief to Sandu’s victory. A closer look at the election results suggests, however, that domestic and foreign challenges will continue putting the EU integration project in Moldova to the test.
In fact, Maia Sandu won mainly thanks to the overwhelming support of the Moldovan diaspora which cast 82.92% of its votes in her favour. The 271,843 citizens who voted for Sandu from abroad constitute almost one third of the total votes that she secured. The voter turnout broke all previous records. Over 325,000 citizens cast their ballot in the run-off, around 85,000 more than in the first round of the elections two weeks before, and around 175,000 more than at the presidential election four years ago. This unprecedented participation was facilitated by the opening of 234 voting stations in 37 countries (mostly in EU Member States) and the fact that almost 100 additional voting stations were opened than in 2020.
Sandu’s landslide victory abroad stands in stark contrast to the election results in the country. If the elections had been decided only by the citizens residing in Moldova, she would have lost. Out of the 1.37 million votes that were cast exclusively in Moldova, the incumbent could only secure 48.97% – falling short by over 36,000 votes compared to her opponent. Stoianoglo did particularly well in rural areas where he scored victories by wide margins, notably in the North and South of the country. In separatist Transnistria and the autonomous region of Gagauzia, Stoianoglo secured 79.40% and 97.04%, respectively. The pro-Russia Socialists, the biggest opposition party which supported Stoianoglo’s candidacy, were quick in labelling Sandu as the “president of the diaspora”, denying the legitimacy of her victory.
Since Sandu presented herself as the candidate personifying EU integration, Stoianoglo’s electoral performance in the country is a sobering revelation, not least as Moldovans living in the country have been the main beneficiaries of the EU’s most recent and rather unprecedented support. Since Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the EU has significantly scaled up its financial assistance in Moldova. Brussels disbursed €177.9 in 2022 and €344.1 Mio. in 2023, thus becoming Moldova’s largest external donor. Since October 2021, the EU has provided over €1.09 billion to support Moldova’s energy security, help it manage the refugee crisis, enhance security and defense cooperation, and strengthen the country’s reform agenda.
The stark contrast between the electoral preferences of the diaspora and citizens living in the country (with respect to both the EU referendum and the presidential elections) demonstrates that Moldova is a country that is sharply divided. While Russian interference (the proportions of which will likely never be fully investigated) certainly played a considerable role in dividing Moldovan society, Kremlin-orchestrated disinformation campaigns and anti-EU narratives fell on very fertile ground.
Part of the reason for Moldova’s high vulnerability to Russia’s disinformation and hybrid warfare is the widespread public dissatisfaction with the PAS government. Over the past three years, the party has not managed to tackle the key challenges facing Moldova: wide-spread corruption, justice reform, lack of law enforcement capacities, micro- and macro-economic development, as well as structural inequalities and poverty. Because of the enduring negative consequences of COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine, including the sharp increase in food and energy prices, a considerable part of Moldovan society suffers from economic hardship.
The pro-EU camp did not manage to effectively communicate both the advantages of EU integration and acknowledge its real challenges to this vulnerable part of the electorate. Sandu’s campaign seemed rather powerless in the face of the destructive and toxic disinformation campaign organised by anti-EU factions in the country, which did not leave any room for a genuine political debate.
In the months leading up to the 2025 parliamentary elections, pro-EU elites must thus find a way to cut through the disinformation and negative narratives surrounding EU integration and pro-actively address the – often even legitimate – concerns of the EU-sceptic segment of Moldovan politics and society. The recently held referendum clearly revealed that the EUropean idea is far from being a guaranteed success or fast-selling item, even with Russia actively continuing its unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression in neighbouring Ukraine. Having learnt lessons from the recently held presidential elections, Russian interference will likely become more systematic and possibly even more sophisticated during the elections next year, trying to further sow discord within Moldovan society. The future of Moldova’s European trajectory, therefore, rests on the pro-EU camp‘s ability to bridge and narrow this divide. Equally essential is the provision of more tangible benefits by the EU.
* Dr. iur. Mihai-Razvan Corman is a Chişinău-based Advisor for the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) working in the field of public sector reform.
The views and opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not reflect the views or positions of the GIZ.
Photo credits: Maia Sandu official Facebook page
