Policy Briefs

Trends and patterns in democracy assistance to the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood between 2005-2022

Maryna Rabinovych and Stiven Kimmel

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Strategic Clarity & Resolve: Confronting Russia in the European Neighbourhood

Igor Gretskiy

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The role of China in the Political transition of the EU’s eastern neighbourhood

Julia Bader

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Transatlantic Influence: How the United States Shapes Political Change in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood

Kakha Gogolashvili

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The challenges and demands of democratic consolidation in Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine

Vassilis Karokis-Mavrikos, Theofanis Exadaktylos & Laura Chapell

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Where and how is authoritarian control most persistently entrenched? The cases of Azerbaijan and Belarus

Marianne Kneuer & Murad Nasibov

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Contested Democracy Narratives in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood: Implications for EU Policy

Andrii Darkovich & Maryna Rabinovych

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  • This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon Europe research and innovation
    programme under grant agreement No 101061738. The Associated Partner University of Surrey has received
    funding from UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) under the UK government’s Horizon Europe funding guarantee
    under grant number 10040721. The Associated Partner University of St. Gallen has received funding from the Swiss
    State Secretariat for Education, Research and Innovation(SERI). Views and opinions expressed are however those
    of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union, UKRI and SERI.

    Neither the European Union nor UKRI or SERI can be held responsible for them.

Trends and patterns in democracy assistance to the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood between 2005-2022

Maryna Rabinovych and Stiven Kimmel

Over the past five years, Official Development Assistance (ODA) to the EU’s six eastern neighborhood countries has steadily increased. Yet, the EU and its member states, collectively the world’s largest ODA donors, face challenges in effectively coordinating aid due to the multiplicity of donors and their differing priorities. Ensuring coherent democracy assistance is particularly complex, given the contested nature of democracy assistance itself and Russia’s destabilising influence in the region. Effective governance of democracy aid requires a shared understanding of democracy models and its intersection with related concepts like human rights, rule of law, and gender equality.

With a view to provide greater clarity to these challenges, the REDEMOS research team has analysed democracy funding patterns in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood, based on a dataset which covers 1.474 democracy assistance projects from 2005 to 2022. The dataset includes contributions from EU institutions (USD 184.25 million), EU member states (USD 146.62 million), the USA (USD 139.07 million), and international organisations (USD 26.33 million). The analysis categorises democracy aid into six models— lectoral, liberal, participatory, egalitarian, peacebuilding, and feminist—while also considering funding for good governance, human rights, and rule of law projects.

The findings highlight the need for improved donor coordination, standardised reporting, and sustained engagement in priority areas to maximise the impact of democracy assistance in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood.

Read the policy briefs in the following languages

Armenian
Azerbaijani
Belarusian
Georgian
English
Russian
Ukrainian

Strategic Clarity & Resolve: Confronting Russia in the European Neighbourhood

Igor Gretskiy

The Russian political establishment has always perceived the collapse of the Soviet Union not as an opportunity to embark on a process towards full-blown democratisation, but as the embodiment of the USSR’s defeat and, consequently, the West’s victory in the Cold War. In general, small and medium-sized neighbouring states are seen by the Kremlin as inherently dependent objects of influence of major powers, while the EU’s eastern neighbourhood, in particular, is regarded as an exclusive space of Russia’s “special responsibility” and as such as an integral component of its self-perceived great power status.

Essentially, Russia has embraced the old Soviet concept of “limited sovereignty”, openly denying the EU’s eastern neighbourhood countries the right to independently determine their foreign policy course. This approach has manifested itself in Russia’s military aggression against Georgia and Ukraine, as well as in its hybrid subversive activities targeting every EU eastern neighbourhood country. Moreover, the Kremlin’s ultimatum of 17 December 2021, demanding from the West to provide Russia legal security guarantees, indicates that its geopolitical ambitions extend far beyond the EU eastern neighbourhood. Under these circumstances, EU member states must adapt their foreign policy to bolster their own security, as well as to help EU eastern neighbourhood countries resist Russia’s attempts to undermine their sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Read the policy briefs in the following languages

Armenian
Azerbaijani
Belarusian
English
Georgian
Russian
Ukrainian

The role of China in the Political transition of the EU’s eastern neighbourhood

Julia Bader

China, while still a relatively new actor, has already positioned itself as an influential player in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood, in contrast to Russia, which has the historical advantage of regional dominance. China’s engagement reveals its economic ambitions and strategic pragmatism, anchored by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The EU’s eastern neighbourhood countries have proactively looked to China, seeing it not only as a source of economic investment—alternative to the EU—but also as a geopolitical counterbalance to Russian influence. China’s political clout in the region, however, remains indirect and limited, suggesting Beijing’s unreliability as a partner, in particular regarding territorial conflicts.

Yet, China’s economic engagement in the six countries poses a significant challenge to the EU’s normative goals, leading to trade imbalances and elite capture, as well as exacerbating vulnerabilities in governance practices. Through media influence and partnerships with educational institutions, China promotes Beijing- friendly narratives and disseminates a discourse that undermines liberal democratic norms. China is also actively promoting its dual-use safety and surveillance technology, making them affordable, and normalizing the use of intrusive applications. Once in place, they risk being used for repressive purposes. By projecting and utilising its soft power, as well as offering economic opportunities without conditions such as stringent reforms, China is able to challenge the EU’s efforts in the region, while reinforcing authoritarian norms and tendencies. In addition, China’s stance with regard to Russia’s aggression further undermines regional security—and thus the security of EU member states.

Read the policy briefs in the following languages

Armenian
Belarusian
English
Georgian
Russian
Ukrainian

Transatlantic Influence: How the United States Shapes Political Change in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood

Kakha Gogolashvili

Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the United States viewed the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood (EN) as a strategic buffer between Euro-Atlantic institutions and Russia, linking democratic governance, energy security, and conflict mitigation as mutually reinforcing priorities. Democratic breakthroughs in EN became key moments when U.S. assistance -through organisations like USAID, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI), and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)—strengthened civil society, electoral processes, and institutional reforms. Engagement grew deeper after Russia’s attacks on Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014, 2022), with successive U.S. administrations increasingly identifying Russia as a systemic threat. The 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy explicitly framed the EN as a frontline in the global contest between democracy and authoritarianism. Yet, U.S. involvement has ultimately become less consistent. Authoritarian resilience in Belarus and Azerbaijan, democratic backsliding in Georgia, and shifting U.S. foreign policy priorities—especially the retreat from democracy promotion during Trump’s second term—reduced strategic coherence. As a result, the effectiveness of U.S. assistance has been highly context-dependent. Research similarly finds no uniform democratising effect, but rather “pockets of impact,” especially in civil society development, electoral reform, and judicial strengthening. Georgia and Armenia illustrate how targeted support can catalyse democratic openings, while Ukraine and Moldova show that progress is possible but constrained by war or state capture. Conversely, in Belarus and Azerbaijan, entrenched autocracy has largely neutralised U.S. influence, limiting assistance to small-scale civil society and media support without systemic change. Overall, U.S. assistance has been most effective where domestic reform coalitions and political pluralism allow external support to be embedded. However, recent backsliding—even in previously successful cases—demonstrates the fragility of democratic gains. This policy brief therefore asks how U.S. engagement can become more coherent and resilient, shifting from crisis-driven responses to sustained efforts that strengthen institutions, protect civil society, and reduce vulnerabilities to authoritarian influence, while aligning more closely with EU priorities and ongoing transatlantic initiatives.

Read the policy briefs in the following languages

Armenian
English
Georgian
Russian
Ukrainian

The challenges and demands of democratic consolidation in Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine

Vassilis Karokis-Mavrikos, Theofanis Exadaktylos & Laura Chapell

Moldova and Ukraine, and to a lesser extent Armenia and Georgia, have traditionally been viewed as countries on a ‘democratisation’ trajectory within the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood policy framework. However, as this policy paper argues, political regimes should not be understood as static or monolithic, but as dynamic and evolving. For the design and implementation of effective, needs-based democracy support, it is therefore essential to assess a country’s current regime trajectory – whether it is moving towards democratic consolidation or experiencing authoritarian drift – alongside the maturity of its democratic institutions and the factors shaping recent trends. To this end, this policy paper combines macro-level democratic indicators with expert assessments to provide an up-to-date diagnosis of regime conditions and trajectories in Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia and Georgia. This approach allows for a nuanced comparison among the region’s democratic frontrunners, identifies key vulnerabilities requiring policy attention, and informs tailored recommendations at both the country and regional levels.

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Armenian
English
Georgian
Russian
Ukrainian

Where and how is authoritarian control most persistently entrenched? The cases of Azerbaijan and Belarus

Marianne Kneuer & Murad Nasibov

The EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood is marked by increasingly divergent regime trajectories. While some countries have experienced periods of democratic opening or partial consolidation, others have moved in the opposite direction and settled into long-term authoritarian rule. Azerbaijan and Belarus stand out as the two most persistent cases of closed autocracy in the region, both remaining resistant to meaningful democratic change over extended periods. EU democracy support has traditionally focused on moments of transition, democratic backsliding, or reform windows. This approach is less effective in contexts where authoritarian rule has become institutionally entrenched and politically stabilised. In such settings, external engagement faces the risk of being miscalibrated if it does not account for how authoritarian control is maintained in practice. Rather than explaining why democratisation has failed, this policy brief therefore asks a more practical question for policymakers: where is democratic governance most persistently constrained?
Azerbaijan and Belarus illustrate that authoritarian persistence is not uniform. Although both are closed autocracies, they differ significantly in their institutional configurations. Azerbaijan’s authoritarian order rests on executive dominance, controlled elections, and judicial subordination, combined with technocratic governance and elite co-optation. Belarus, by contrast, has consolidated authoritarian rule through the near-total closure of civil society, repression of academic and cultural freedom, and politicisation of the judiciary, particularly after the violent suppression of the 2020 protests. These differences matter for policy design. Treating closed autocracies as a single category risks overlooking variation in institutional vulnerabilities and potential entry points for engagement. By focusing on regime dynamics and institutional constraints, this policy brief provides a diagnostic basis for regime-sensitive democracy support that avoids one-size-fits-all approaches and instead tailors engagement to the specific configuration of authoritarian control.

Read the policy briefs in the following languages

English
Georgian
Russian
Ukrainian

Contested Democracy Narratives in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood: Implications for EU Policy

Andrii Darkovich & Maryna Rabinovych

The EU’s eastern neighbourhood has become a central arena of contestation between liberal-democratic and authoritarian models of order. The EU, together with like-minded partners, seeks to support democratisation, rule of law and human rights in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. At the same time, Russia and, to a lesser extent, China, promote alternative visions of political order that challenge the EU’s claim to normative leadership and its capacity to act as a credible security and development partner.
Over the past decade, Russia has increasingly framed liberal democracy as a civilisational threat, portraying Western support for democratic movements as a form of geopolitical warfare. These narratives are not simply external propaganda; they are co-produced with local actors and entangled with domestic grievances, identity conflicts and security dilemmas. In this sense, FIMI(Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference) is less an exogenous shock than a set of discursive resources that domestic elites can mobilise to legitimise authoritarian consolidation, slow-rolling reforms or selective alignment with Moscow.
China’s presence in the information space of the eastern neighbourhood is more limited, yet its performance-based, development-centred narrative provides an important reference point for governments and publics that are disillusioned with the slow, conditional and sometimes inconsistent nature of Western democracy support. In Georgia in particular, Chinese messaging intersects with domestic debates on economic dependence, infrastructure and diversification, offering a “third way” that does not demand liberal reforms.

Read the policy briefs in the following languages

Armenian
English
Georgian
Russian
Ukrainian